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RECENT CASES

tended to a grocery store, 10 a hotel,1 1 a boarding house, 12 and a doctor's
office. 13 In recent years, liability has been found in cases of a beer parlor
and recreation hall, 14 beauty shop, , office building,"6 and business building.' 7 Since the landlord's liability for injuries to lessee's invitees was
extended to small shops in 1939,18 a majority of the state courts who have
had occasion to pass on the question have followed this rule. 19
It might be contended that the exception could easily swallow the
rule and that it places unlimited liability on the landlord of premises used
for other than private purposes, but several practical limitations have been
placed on the rule. The landlord is only liable for defective conditions
which exist at the time of the lease 20 and his responsibility only extends to
those parts of the premises that are thrown open to the public. Also, he is
2
only liable for those uses contemplated by the lease. '
Wyoming has not decided this issue, but recent cases in surrounding
22
states show a trend toward the more liberal view.
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THE OBLIGATION OF THE INSURER TO DEFEND ALL SUITS BROUGHT
AGAINST THE INSURED

The Hardware Mutual Casualty Company sued the executors of A. R.
Shantz for a declaratory judgment to determine the rights of the parties
under a policy of public liability or indemnity insurance issued to the

decedent by the company. The suit was dismissed for lack of federal
jurisdiction. At the time of this suit there was pending in the state court
an action against the executors of Shantz. They had made demands on
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Turner v. Kent, 134 Kan. 574, 7 P.(2d) 513; Senner v. Danewolf, 139 Ore. 93,
6 P.(2d) 240 (1932).
Colorado Mortgage & Investment Co. v. Giacomini, 55 Colo. 540, 136 Pac. 1039
(1913).
Stenberg v. Willcox, 96 Tenn. 163, 33 S.W. 917 (1896); See Note 34 L.R.A. 615.
Gilligan v. Blakesley, 93 Colo. 370, 26 P.(2d) 808 (1933).
Nelson v. Hokuf, 140 Nebr. 290, 299 N.W. 472 (1941).
Wood v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 212 Minn. 551, 4 N.W.(2d) 617 (1942).
Holm v. Investment & Securities Co., 195 Wash. 52, 79 P. (2d) 708 (1938); McCarthy
v. Maxon, 134 Conn. 170, 55 A.(2d) 912 (1947).
Blumberg v. M. & T. Inc., - Calif. -, 209 P. (2d) 1 (1949).
Webel v. Yale University, supra; 24 Minn. L. Rev. 283, 284.
Olin v. Honstead, 60 Idaho 211, 91 P.(2d) 380 (1939); Nelson v. 1okuf, supra;
Wood v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, supra; Fletcher v. Suncl, 19 Wash. 596, 143
P.(2d) 538 (1943); McCarthy v. Maxon, supra; Blumherg v. M. F&T. Inc., supra.
See Note 123 A.L.R. 870, 872.
Prosser, Torts, supra.
Olin v. Honstead, supra; Nelson v. Hokuf, supra; Blumherg v. M. & T. Inc., supra;
Fletcher v. Sunel, supra.
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the insurance company and there had been a refusal on the part of the
insurance company to defend that action in the state court, and to indemnify
the insured against any judgement rendered therein against the defendant's
estate. Held, the purpose of the declaratory judgement act is to settle
actual controversies before they ripen into violation of law or a breach of
some contractual duty and that the insurance company may by declaratory
judgement' determine its liability to defend. Hardware Mutual Casualty
Company v. Shantz et al, 178 F. (2d) 779 (C.A. 5th, 1949).
In Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company v. Hammer 2 one Wagner
was convicted of murder in the second degree for intentionally and maliciously causing the death of one of five persons by intentionally driving
his truck into their car. The insurance company appeared in the civil
suit in the state court and then withdrew when it determined the duty
to defend no longer existed. The company now seeks a declaratory judgement to determine its rights under an assault and battery clause which
stated that assault and battery shall be deemed an accident "unless committed by or at the direction of the insured." The court held the insurance
company not liable, and the court said "a third party cannot be called upon
to defend an action where his showing himself not to be liable will not necessarily result in a judgment in favor of the party asking him to defend." There
was a dissent which stated that the clear purpose of the provision was to
impose upon the company not only an obligation to pay any judgement
against the insured, but also to bear the burden of defending any suit
against him within the purview of the policy. The dissent was based on
the feeling that the decision of the court in the civil suits was conclusive
since the petition alleged negligence.
In Lee v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Company,3 where both parties
appealed from a summary judgement, the court held that the insurer ought
to defend an action where there is doubt as to the liability for defending,
until it appears that the claim is not covered by the policy. The court
did not concern itself with the rule that the insurer once it assumes the
defense of the suit, will be estopped to deny its liability.
Which of these three recent decisions lend themselves to stability of
rights? The principal case would allow a separate suit adjudicating the
issue of the obligation to defend, so that the insured may be called upon
to defend such additional suits. Under the Hammer decision the liability
of the insurer to defend would be determined from the facts presented in
1.

Title 28 U.S.C.A. 2201: In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction,
except with respect to federal taxes, any court of the United States upon the filing
of appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations of any
interested party seeking such declarations, whether or not further relief is or could
be sought. Any such declarations shall have the force and effect of a final judgement or decree and shall be reviewable as such.
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Farm Bureau Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Hammer, 177 F. (2d) 793
(C.A. 4th, 1949)
Lee v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Company, 178 F. (2d) 750 (C.A. 2nd, 1949).
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the pleadings, and by the Lee decision, the insured party purchases for himself a defense to every action brought, until the trial itself discloses freedom
from liability on the part of the insured.
One may question the right of the insurer to bring a declaratory judgement under the facts presented in the principal case. Some courts hold
that this is the type action for which the declaratory judgements act was
passed i.e, to determine if there might be a possible breach of contract by
a refusal of the insurance company to defend the action brought by the
injured party. Other courts hold that there can be no suit brought upon
these facts since there exists other adequate remedies 4 and the declaratory
judgement cannot be used to supplant these remedies; 5 that the insurer's
liability could be determined in the pending action since made a party by
statute; 6 that the declaratory judgment should not be used in an effort to
avoid sending issues of insurance to the jury. 7 When damage suits are
brought neither the company nor the insured knows for certain that they
are within the policy's coverage. This could in some cases only be ascertained at the end of the litigation and doubtless the likelihood that such a
situation might arise is what induced the making of a contract requiring
the company to investigate and defend, whether the action was groundless
or not. 8
One may question the propriety of bringing a declaratory judgement.
The bringing-of such a suit is not conducive to a reduction in the amount
of litigation, an open and avowed policy of the courts. The insured may
be called upon to defend additional suits when in fact under the policy
of insurance, 9 he believed he was purchasing insurance which would effect
a defense ° to a suit brought for any accident in which he might be involved.
The insurer has sufficient legal protection without the addition of a
declaratory judgment which may or may not adjudicate the fundamental
problem of the construction of the provision of the policy calling for the
defense of any action brought against the insured. When the insurer
desires to make the defense that the injuries are not within the coverage
of the policy, it may take the risk of refusing to defend the suit against
the insured, or it may be able to reserve the defense of non-coverage for a
Of what effect is such
subsequent suit under a non-waiver agreement."'
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Aetna Life Insurance Company v. Richmond, 107 Conn. 117, 139 A. 702 (1927).
Meshitt v. Manufacturers' Casualty Insurance Company, 310 Pa. 374, 165 A. 403

(1933). Miller v. Siden, 259 Mich. 19, 242 N.W. 823 (1932).
Dover Boiler Works v. New Jersey Manufacurers Casualty Insurance Company,
18 N.J. Misc. 573, 15 A.(2d) 231 (1940).
Automobile Mutual Indeminity Company v. Moore, 235 Ala. 426, 179 So. 368 (1938).

Utica Mutual Insurance Company v. Beers Chevrolet Company, 250 N.Y. App. Div.
238, 294 N.Y. Supp. 82 (1937).
Union Indemnity Company v. Mostov, 41 Ohio App. 518, 181 N.E. 495 (1932).
The term liability as defined by the policy relates only to the satisfaction of any

judgements recovered and not to the obligation to defend even if groundless.
The duty to defend is broader than the duty to pay. Goldberg v. Lumber Mutual
Casualty Insurance Company, 297 N.Y. 148, 77 N.E. (2d) 131 (1948).
Klefbeck v. Donis, 302 Mass. 383, 19 N.E. (2d) 308 (1939).
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a declaratory judgement when rendered prior to the adjudication of the
suit between the injured and the insured, if the plaintiff in that suit changes
his theory of pleading, or changes his petition so that the policy now
covers the claim?12 Will this in turn subject the insured party to another
suit brought by the insurer? The possibilities of such activities by an
insurance company are almost limitless; and as equally unnecessary in the
future were the Wyoming court to adhere to rule 14a of the Wyoming
proposed rules.13 If the declaratory judgement is brought after an adjudication of the first suit, of what value is it? The insurer could simply wait
until suit was brought on the satisfaction of the first judgement without
incurring any additional liability. To solve this problem of extra litigation
by deciding the question in the first suit would not be without its procedural difficulties, but as the courts seek a reduction in the amount of litigation here is an open question still to be conclusively determined. Now
that financial responsibility laws are being enacted in many states, Wyoming included,' 4 and insurance becomes more the accepted rule than the
exception among car owners, there would be no need for the present attempts of injured plaintiffs to influence the jury by subvertive mention of
insurance or of questioning prospective jurors on insurance, instead the
insurance company's liability could be determined in the suit brought by
the injured party.
The more desirable solution appears in decisions under Federal Rule
14a. The purpose of third party practice is to avoid circuity of action and
permit determination in a single action of rights and liabilities of parties
growing out of facts that relate to the same transaction where it appears
that the third party may be liable to the defendant or to the plaintiff for
the claim asserted against the defendant, impleader should be allowed.' 5
12.
13.
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Wyoming Compiled Statutes 1945, section 3-1704.
Rule 14. Third Party Practice. (A) When defendant may bring in third party.
Before the service of his answer a defendant may move ex parte or, after the service
of his answer, on notice to the plaintiff, for leave as a third party plaintiff to serve
a summons and complaint upon a person not a party to the action who is or may
he liable to him for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against him. If the motion
is granted and the summons and complaint are served, the person so served, hereinafter called the third party defendant, shall make his defenses to the third party
plaintiff's claim as provided in Rule 12 and his counter claims against the third
party plaintiff and cross claims against other third party defendants as provided
in Rule 13. The third party defendant may assert against the plaintiff any defenses
which the third party plaintiff has to the plaintiff's claim.
The third party defendant may also assert any claim against the plaintiff arising
out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the plaintiff's
claim against the third party plaintiff. The plaintiff may assert any claim against
the third party defendant arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the
subject matter of the plaintiff's claim against the third party plaintiff, and the
third party defendant thereupon shall assert his defenses as provided in Rule 12,
and his counter claims and cross claims as provided in Rule 13. A third party
defendant may proceed tinder this rule against any person not a party to the action
who is or may be liable to him for all or part of the claim made in the action
against the third party defendant.
Wyoming Compiled Statutes 1945, section 60-1605.
Carbola Chemical Company Incorporated v. Trundle Engineering Company, 7 F. R.
Service 14a 1i, 3 F.R.D. 500 (S.D.N.Y. 1942).
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In an action for negligence the defendant may implead an insurance
company which had contracted with the defendant to pay loss from liability
imposed by law upon the defendant and to defend litigation against the
defendant where the insurer has refused to defend the action in spite of
the fact that the policy provides that no action shall lie against the insurer
unless the claim has been fixed and rendered certain either by judgment
or by agreement between the parties with the written consent of the
insurer. 16
Under such procedures as adopted by some courts the insurer may
defend the insured and still reserve its defense on the policy in respect of
forfeiture for non-coverage and where it does so no waiver or estoppel may
be invoked to preclude the company from asserting non-liability. I[ the
insurer were impleaded to defend every suit until freedom from liability
was shown there would be no possible opportunity for a second suit upon
the liability under the policy or of the obligation to defend.
WAYNE
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Action by Mary Foster against the Roman Catholic Diocese of Vermont
to recover for injuries sustained in a fall on ice which had allegedly formed
on the public sidewalk as a result of negligent construction of the church
premises. Plaintiff was leaving the morning services when the accident
occurred. The defendant answered that due care had been used and
the defendant should be exempt from liability on the ground that it was a
charitable institution. The plaintiff's demurrer was overruled, the answer
said to be sufficient, and the case came before the Supreme Court of Vermont on the, plaintiff's exceptions to the court's overruling the demurrer.
Held, order overruling the demurrer reversed and the cause is remanded.
The defendant charity is not entitled to immunity from liability merely
because it is a privately conducted charitable institution. Foster v. Roman
Catholic Diocese of Vermont, 70 A. (2d) 230 (1950).
Action by Harold E. Haynes against the Presbyterian Hospital Association for injuries resulting from the alleged negligence of the defendant's
servants. The defendant is a non-profit corporation organized under the
laws of the State of Iowa. The plaintiff was a paying patient in the
defendant's hospital when he received the injuries'complained of. Held,
the incorporated charity should respond as do private individuals, business
16.

Jordan v. Stephens v. Standard Accident Insurance Company, 9 F. R. Service, 7
F.R.D. 140

(W.D. Mo. 1945).

